Dictators fall when they lose control. Interview with Victoria Azad, an Iranian-Swedish woman who values humanity and fights for freedom in her country of origin. Given the diversity of voices on Iran and the ideas for overthrowing the regime and starting afresh in Iran, I asked a former political colleague of Reza Pahlavi to answer three questions about Iran and Reza Pahlavi. Here she shares her views.
Helmut N. Gabel: Given the large number of videos and analyses, some believe that the end of the Islamic Republic is near. What is your assessment, and what steps still need to be taken?
Victoria Azad: The Islamic Republic is without doubt facing the deepest structural crisis it has experienced since 1979. The geographic spread of the protests, their continuity, and the participation of different layers of society clearly demonstrate that the regime’s political legitimacy has completely collapsed. For many years now, the majority of Iranian society has lost any hope of reform from within this system.
However, the collapse of an authoritarian regime does not occur simply as a result of street protests. What brings a regime down is the combination of a nationwide uprising, nationwide strikes, the full breakdown of the military and security apparatus, and the emergence of a credible alternative force of governance. Historical experience shows that three key components have not yet been fully realized in Iran, although they may materialize in the near future.
Dictators fall when they lose control
First, coordinated nationwide strikes, particularly in vital and strategic sectors of the economy such as oil, gas, petrochemicals, transportation, and heavy industry. Protest without economic paralysis severely weakens the regime morally and economically, but it does not deprive it of its operational capacity or its ability to repress. These strikes have been underway for more than thirteen days, but they have not yet entered their decisive phase. Oil is still being produced for export, truck drivers have not yet fully joined the movement, and large parts of the industrial sector remain active. Bazaar strikes are extremely important, but they must expand into higher and more strategic levels of the economy.
Second, the creation of deep fractures within the ruling system, especially among the security and repressive forces. Authoritarian regimes usually do not fall solely because of popular uprisings, but when—alongside mass protests—the apparatus of repression becomes internally unstable, excessively costly, and unsustainable. Defections are happening rapidly, but there is still some distance to go before weapons are laid down. Protests and acts of resistance undoubtedly shorten this timeline and are highly effective. However, for a decisive victory, millions must take to the streets; tens of thousands are not enough.
Third, the existence of a credible framework for political transition that reassures society, minorities, and the international community that a viable alternative force of governance exists.
At present, there is significant media exaggeration surrounding the idea of an “imminent collapse.” But without nationwide strikes in key economic sectors, the collapse of the regime will be difficult.
External threats—unless they are translated into concrete action rather than rhetoric—will not meaningfully contribute to the fall of the government.
Dictators fall when they completely lose money, control, and the loyalty of their followers—not because of rumours, media-imposed deadlines, or emotionally driven social-media scenarios.
H.N.G.: Why is the name Reza Pahlavi mentioned as a leader in some videos, and why do no other figures appear as prominently?
Victoria Azad: In parts of Asian and Middle Eastern societies, especially during periods of social and political instability, there is a growing tendency to seek refuge in individuals. In such moments, societies turn to symbols rather than to genuine, program-driven leadership.
Today, Reza Pahlavi is, for some Iranians, less a political symbol or national leader than a representation of “what the Islamic Republic is not.” For others, however, he and his movement are seen as the other side of the same coin as the Islamic Republic—two oppressive symbols, Sheikh and Shah alike.
A few of my compatriots believe that Reza Pahlavi intends to “come and rebuild Iran” for them. In reality, he is primarily focused on generating income for himself and his team, while viewing Iranian society as compliant and submissive, capable of obedience rather than self-determination.
The prominence of Reza Pahlavi has several reasons:
• He is a familiar name that predates the Islamic Republic and evokes nostalgia for the Shah’s era for part of Iranian society. At the same time, many Iranians carry deeply painful memories of the Pahlavi period, including repression, executions, and the violence of SAVAK.
• For some—particularly those who have collaborated with the Islamic Republic—Reza Pahlavi is seen as a low-risk and flexible figure in the context of “amnesty and forgiveness.” He does not believe in transitional justice and has publicly stated that he would grant blanket amnesty. Many bereaved families and justice-seeking victims—who are very numerous—see him, through this approach, as complicit with the crimes of the Islamic Republic.
• Decades of systematic repression of political movements, extensive censorship, and the destruction of independent parties and organizations have effectively eliminated alternative leadership and left society in a state of political suspension.
This phenomenon does not in any way indicate that protesters have assessed Reza Pahlavi’s leadership skills or political program. Rather, it reflects a widespread lack of familiarity with organized political currents available to the broader public in Iran. The reality is that there is no genuine, broad national consensus around Reza Pahlavi.
Field evidence and hundreds of published videos show that the dominant slogans are unequivocally directed against the Islamic Republic, not in support of Reza Pahlavi. There are videos in which four or five individuals chant slogans in favour of the Shah or Reza Pahlavi, but the surrounding crowds do not join them.
Authoritarian systems destroy political pluralism so thoroughly that, at moments of weakening, the silent segment of society clings to the few names it still recognizes—even if those names are not the product of democratic choice.
That said, recent developments show that a large portion of Iranian society has moved beyond this phase and is now demanding the establishment of a new political structure—a secular, democratic, republican system that represents neither a return to the past nor the continuation of the present order.
Preferable Alternative
H.N.G.: What are Reza Pahlavi’s chances of playing a role in Iran’s future, and what is the preferable alternative?
Victoria Azad: In my view, Reza Pahlavi not only lacks any meaningful chance of playing a decisive role in Iran’s future, but in several instances has played a divisive and destructive role. His behaviour and positions suggest that he is far more engaged in attention-seeking and personality-centered politics than in social cohesion or democratic principles.
Reza Pahlavi, by inciting and encouraging his supporters inside Iran, has created fear among many layers of his opponents. Many Iranians—especially ethnic groups—are still absent from this nationwide uprising because they do not agree with Reza Pahlavi. Meanwhile, major media outlets such as Iran International, Manoto, and even the BBC aggressively promote the narrative as if Reza Pahlavi were the alternative to the Islamic regime. Through this tactic, they hinder the expansion of the Iranian people’s movement, and Reza Pahlavi himself actively encourages this process.
With his characteristic charlatanism, Reza Pahlavi announced yesterday that he is ready to return to Iran—despite the fact that just three months ago he told Patrick Bet-David:
“My life is here in America… my children and everyone I know are here… if I return to Iran, where would I even be returning to?”
Either Reza Pahlavi is a delusional charlatan, or he is trapped in the tangled web of his own contradictions.
Iran is a multi-ethnic, pluralistic, and deeply politicized society. The future of such a society cannot be built on inherited symbols, exile politics, or personal branding. It requires the following elements:
• Institutional and organizational legitimacy, emerging from sustained political and grassroots struggle, strategic consistency, and responsible decision-making at critical moments
• Accountability and responsibility toward society
• A clear and non-negotiable commitment to secular democratic principles
• Acceptance by Iran’s diverse social, ethnic, and political forces
The preferable alternative is a collective transitional framework, or a pluralistic transitional council: a temporary and representative body emerging from within Iranian society and supported by civil movements, labour networks, women’s organizations, and minority groups—rather than a structure centred on a single individual.
Iran does not need a saviour.
Iran needs durable institutions, public trust, and a clear break from personality-based politics.
@Helmut N. Gabel, mehriran.de, 11.01.2026
