A trapped animal: An interview with political analyst and Iranian exile Victoria Azad about the regime in Iran. The situation in the Middle East has been highly volatile since the beginning of this year and is characterized by numerous tactical manoeuvres by the protagonists, the USA and the Islamic Republic of Iran. What seemed relevant yesterday can prove meaningless today, and vice versa, and many other variations exist. Besides kinetic strikes on military installations, weapons factories, and infrastructure, the media landscape is emerging as a key arena for swaying public opinion in favour of one side or the other. We conducted the interview in writing over several days.
A trapped animal: situation of the regime
1. How do you assess the current situation of the regime in Iran?
The Islamic Republic today resembles a trapped animal: not defeated, but no longer free to maneuver. It faces simultaneous pressures on multiple fronts and has limited room for either advance or retreat.
The regime is currently confronted with several major crises: severe economic deterioration, a deep crisis of social legitimacy following repeated protest movements, growing regional and security pressures, and persistent internal rivalries within the power structure. Although no major defections are yet visible at the highest levels of the regime, this should not be mistaken for genuine unity.
In my view, these pressures have encouraged the regime to adopt limited tactical flexibility toward the United States. However, this should not be interpreted as a strategic transformation. The ideological foundations and core objectives of the Islamic Republic remain unchanged.
Under current conditions, the regime appears to be pursuing three main goals:
- Buying time by prolonging negotiations and waiting for a potentially more favorable international environment.
- Reducing external pressure through tactical concessions without altering its fundamental policies.
- Preventing the convergence of social discontent into a broader civic movement through repression, intimidation, imprisonment, executions, and the fragmentation of civil society.
This explains why we occasionally observe softer rhetoric, limited concessions, or shifts in media tactics. Such moves are primarily survival mechanisms rather than signs of genuine reform.
As a result, the Islamic Republic currently combines relative flexibility in foreign policy with continued rigidity at home. While seeking to ease international pressure, it continues to rely on repression, security control, and restrictions on civil society as its principal instruments of domestic governance.
From my perspective, many Western policymakers underestimate the extent to which the regime views negotiations as a tactical tool rather than a path toward fundamental change. For this reason, I believe that reducing pressure without securing meaningful structural concessions risks strengthening the regime rather than moderating its behavior.
In short, the current flexibility of the Islamic Republic is best understood as a survival strategy rather than a genuine ideological or strategic transformation.
A trapped animal: civil society in Iran
2. What are thoughts of people in Iran you might know concerning the situation of different levels of civil society in Iran?
Inside Iran, and even among many Iranians abroad, a growing sense of disappointment and political exhaustion is increasingly visible. Confidence in the possibility of political change through domestic mobilization and public protest has declined significantly compared to previous years.
Many people believe that the Islamic Republic’s security and military apparatus remains both willing and capable of using extensive force to suppress large-scale protests. As a result, a considerable segment of society no longer views street demonstrations alone as sufficient to alter the political balance of power.
This has produced another important development: many opponents of the regime increasingly look to external pressure as a potential catalyst for change. In recent years, public messages, slogans, and even banners circulating in public spaces and on social media have reflected appeals to external actors—particularly the United States and Israel—to increase pressure on the Islamic Republic.
Whether one agrees with this view or not, it reflects a declining level of confidence among parts of society in the ability of domestic forces alone to bring about political change.
At the same time, Iranian civil society has suffered serious setbacks. Repression, arrests, executions, intimidation, and constant security pressure have weakened many civic and social networks. In my assessment, Iranian civil society remains alive, but it is operating under unprecedented pressure, while the regime is acting with greater harshness and fewer restraints than in the past.
In my view, if current conditions persist and economic, social, and political grievances continue to accumulate, Iran may witness new waves of protest and nationwide strikes in the future. There is also a possibility that, if peaceful avenues for expressing public demands remain closed, parts of society may adopt more radical approaches and become increasingly willing to engage in direct confrontation with security and law-enforcement forces.
A trapped animal: Israel
3. What are your thoughts on Israel? Does Benjamin Netanyahu push for the fall of the regime in Iran? How would he try to achieve this goal?
In my assessment, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to welcome the weakening—and potentially even the eventual collapse—of the Islamic Republic. However, whether regime change is Israel’s official and primary objective remains open to debate. Israel’s stated policy has consistently focused on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability and limiting its missile and regional military capabilities.
If Netanyahu ultimately views the fall of the Islamic Republic as desirable, it is unlikely that he would seek to achieve this through a direct military occupation of Iran. Rather, such an objective would likely be pursued through a combination of military, intelligence, political, and psychological pressure.
Several possible elements of such a strategy include:
1. Eroding the regime’s military and security capabilities
- Targeting missile, drone, and nuclear infrastructure.
- Eliminating key military commanders and disrupting command-and-control structures.
- Increasing the overall cost of maintaining the regime’s regional and military posture.
2. Undermining the regime’s legitimacy
- Drawing a distinction between the Iranian people and the Islamic Republic.
- Communicating directly with the Iranian public and highlighting the regime’s vulnerabilities.
- Encouraging perceptions that the government is increasingly isolated and weakened.
3. Expanding intelligence and cyber pressure
- Intelligence operations, infiltration, cyber activities, and efforts to deepen mistrust within the ruling establishment.
- Creating the perception that the regime is unable to fully protect its own institutions and leadership.
4. Exploiting internal fractures
- Israel may be counting less on a sudden popular uprising and more on growing divisions within the ruling elite, tensions among security institutions, succession-related uncertainties, and the long-term effects of Iran’s economic deterioration.
Based on available evidence, Netanyahu appears to have reached several conclusions:
- The Islamic Republic cannot be sustainably contained through limited agreements alone.
- Significant weakening of the regime could deepen existing internal divisions.
- Under the right conditions, political transformation or even regime collapse could ultimately serve Israel’s security interests.
That said, it is important to distinguish between weakening a regime and overthrowing a regime.
Israel may be able to:
- Reduce the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities.
- Increase pressure on its economy and security apparatus.
- Contribute to conditions that intensify public dissatisfaction.
However, actual regime change would remain extremely difficult without a powerful domestic factor—namely, the large-scale and organized participation of millions of Iranians through sustained nationwide protests, civil resistance, and strikes. Experiences in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan suggest that external pressure or military action alone rarely guarantees a stable political transition.
Ultimately, whether such a scenario succeeds depends far more on developments inside Iran: the willingness of Iranian citizens to pursue change, the organizational capacity of opposition forces, divisions within the ruling establishment, and the policies adopted by the United States and other international actors. Israel can influence the environment, but it cannot by itself determine Iran’s political future.
Moreover, even in recent periods, differences have occasionally emerged between President Trump’s administration and Netanyahu regarding the appropriate level of pressure and escalation toward Iran, underscoring the fact that external actors do not always share identical objectives or strategies.
A trapped animal: President Trump
4. What are your thoughts on the US? Does President Trump favour a peace treaty tied to his Abraham Accords for the whole region to bringing down the regime in Iran?
In my view, Trump’s policy is based on creating divisions and internal fractures within the Islamic Republic. The negotiations are being used as a tool to weaken the regime’s hardline core. Through his political maneuvering, Trump has contributed to serious divisions between supporters and opponents of an agreement with the United States.
Recent demonstrations by hardline Hezbollah-aligned supporters in various Iranian cities, despite their relatively small numbers, have been marked by loud and aggressive rhetoric. During these rallies, slogans such as “Death to America, Araghchi, and Ghalibaf” have been heard. These groups advocate continued confrontation with the United States and regard negotiations with what they describe as the killer of their leader as an act of betrayal.
In another sign of growing tensions, Mahmoud Karimi Haddadian, a well-known eulogist closely associated with Khamenei’s camp, reportedly warned regime insiders that anyone who deviates from the approved path would face consequences. Videos circulating from these gatherings and clashes among hardline supporters suggest that divisions within the regime camp have moved beyond behind-the-scenes disagreements and are now becoming visible in the streets.
Trump’s approach appears designed to create confusion, uncertainty, and strategic disorientation across different layers of the Iranian establishment. So far, this policy seems to be producing some results. However, while such outcomes may be necessary, they are not sufficient on their own.
In my opinion, even if a memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States is eventually signed—something that remains uncertain at this stage—it would not fundamentally alter the broader strategy of moving from containment toward a gradual and peaceful transformation of the regime. I believe that the future envisioned by Washington and its regional allies ultimately involves the emergence of a different political order in Iran that maintains friendly relations with both the United States and Israel.
All political developments should therefore be analyzed within the context of that broader strategic framework. At the same time, implementing such a strategy is likely to take considerable time, because neither Iranian society nor the Iranian opposition currently appears fully prepared for a major political transition. Conditions may look very different six months from now, but until then, the question is not whether change will come quickly or slowly—it is simply a matter of timing.
A trapped animal: Reza Pahlavi
5. What are your current thoughts on the movement of Iranians in exile that tries to present Mr Reza Pahlavi as the most cherished future leader for Iran?
In my view, the extensive and costly efforts undertaken to promote Reza Pahlavi have ultimately revealed an important reality: he is not a consensus figure among Iranians. Rather than being a national leader, he is primarily the leader of only one segment of the monarchist movement, and even within that camp a number of former supporters have publicly stated that they no longer regard him as their leader.
For this reason, Reza Pahlavi cannot realistically be described as the leader of the Iranian opposition or of the Iranian people as a whole. On the contrary, his political role has increasingly become associated with divisions within the opposition and an apparent inability to manage and unify his own supporters.
As his political position has become more fragile, efforts have recently been made to promote his daughter, Noor Pahlavi, as a new public figure. However, there is little evidence that she enjoys broader appeal among Iranians. At the same time, a range of issues and controversies have emerged that have led many people to question the judgment, conduct, and political credibility of the Pahlavi family.
Many critics argue that Reza Pahlavi’s actions and political decisions during the protests and unrest of late 2024 alienated a significant portion of his supporters. As a result, some former backers now dismiss him as little more than a political figure lacking independence and initiative.
More fundamentally, contemporary Iranians neither possess nor seek a single universally accepted leader. Historical experience has taught many Iranians that personality cults and excessive concentration of power in one individual often pave the way for authoritarianism and dictatorship. For that reason, collective and council-based leadership models are viewed by many as a more democratic and desirable alternative for Iran’s future.
A trapped animal: Russia and China
6. What are your thoughts on Russia and China? How do they still support the IRI?
In my view, both Russia and China have strategic reasons to prefer the survival of the Islamic Republic, even if neither of them is driven by ideological affinity with the regime.
Russia benefits from tensions between Iran and the West. A prolonged negotiation process can consume diplomatic attention and political capital in Washington, while reducing the focus on Russia’s actions in Ukraine. From Moscow’s perspective, any development that complicates American strategic priorities may be advantageous.
China’s interests are primarily economic. Iran has become an important energy supplier to China, and Chinese companies have benefited from access to Iranian oil under conditions that are often more favorable than those available on global markets. Beijing therefore has a strong interest in regional stability and in preventing developments that could disrupt energy flows or threaten its economic interests in Iran.
More broadly, both Russia and China oppose a world order dominated by the United States. While they do not necessarily support every action of the Islamic Republic, they generally prefer a government in Tehran that remains outside the Western alliance system and acts as a counterweight to American influence in the Middle East.
For these reasons, Moscow and Beijing are likely to favor the continuation of the current political order in Iran over an abrupt transition whose outcome would be uncertain and potentially more aligned with Western interests.
Russia’s cooperation with the Islamic Republic has included military, security, and diplomatic dimensions in recent years. Cooperation in Syria, exchanges of military technology, and political coordination in various international forums are among the most visible examples of this relationship.
China, by contrast, approaches Iran primarily through an economic lens. The purchase of Iranian oil, limited investments, the preservation of trade relations, and opposition to certain international pressure campaigns against Tehran have been among the most important aspects of China’s relationship with the Islamic Republic.
A trapped animal: European Union
7. What are your thoughts on the EU? What makes some EU politicians still believe that the regime in Iran can be appeased by promises and treaties?
In my view, many European politicians do not support the Islamic Republic itself; rather, they support a policy of risk management. Their primary concern is that a sudden collapse of the regime could lead to regional instability, refugee flows, military conflict, or an uncontrolled expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme.
For more than two decades, the European Union has invested significant diplomatic capital in negotiations with Iran. As a result, many European policymakers continue to believe that diplomacy, agreements, and gradual pressure are preferable to military confrontation and unpredictable political upheaval.
At the same time, I believe some European leaders have overestimated the ability of engagement and economic incentives to moderate the behaviour of the Islamic Republic. The expectation that trade, dialogue, and diplomatic agreements would gradually transform the regime has produced mixed results and remains a subject of intense debate.
Europe’s approach toward Iran has therefore often been shaped by a choice between imperfect options: accepting the frustrations of diplomacy or facing the risks of escalation and instability. Whether that calculation has been correct remains one of the most controversial questions in European foreign policy.
A trapped animal: survival
8. How long do you think this regime in Iran can still survive in the face of multiple crisis?
In my view, it is impossible to predict the exact lifespan of the Islamic Republic. History has shown that political systems sometimes survive far longer than expected and, in other cases, collapse much more suddenly than experts anticipate.
What is clear, however, is that the Islamic Republic is facing multiple and interconnected crises: economic stagnation, corruption, environmental challenges, declining public trust, social discontent, generational change, and growing pressure both domestically and internationally.
The key question is not how many crises a government faces, but whether it still possesses the institutional capacity, financial resources, and political legitimacy necessary to manage those crises. In my opinion, the Islamic Republic’s greatest challenge today is not external pressure, but the gradual erosion of its legitimacy among broad segments of Iranian society.
At the same time, the regime still possesses important instruments of power, including security institutions, administrative structures, financial resources, and international partners. These factors should not be underestimated.
For this reason, I do not believe anyone can confidently predict whether the system will survive for months, years, or even longer. What can be said is that the gap between the state and society appears deeper than at any previous point in the history of the Islamic Republic, and such a situation is rarely sustainable indefinitely.
Ultimately, Iran’s future will depend on the interaction and effectiveness of several factors: the activism and mobilization of people across Iran, social movements, divisions within the ruling establishment and the potential fragmentation of power, the trajectory of economic decline, regional developments, pressure from Trump and Netanyahu (the United States and Israel), the efforts of the opposition, and the ability—or inability—of the Iranian regime to adapt to the realities on the ground.
@mehriran.de, Helmut N. Gabel, 14.06.2026
Victoria Azad is a prominent political figure who has been actively fighting against the Islamic Republic of Iran for 46 years in various ways and on multiple fronts. She is widely recognized as a political analyst, strategist, author, and media personality. Over the years, Ms. Azad has founded and led several organizations dedicated to overthrowing the Islamic regime, gaining invaluable experience in organizational and party work. She is the founder of the IranYaran Network and maintains active relationships with various political groups and figures within the Iranian opposition.
Ms. Azad has long-standing connections with political activists in Iran and has consistently advocated for political prisoners. For this reason, she is on the Islamic regime’s blacklist for intelligence and security services. She has authored numerous important articles and is considered one of the key figures in the Iranian opposition. She has thousands of followers and is frequently called upon to comment on political developments in Iran.
Victoria joined the „Front for the Revival of Law and National Sovereignty in Iran“ a few months ago and is currently working with Vahid Beheshti, Mostafa Azmayesh and the Front’s team.
