A remarkable case and the remarkable silence in the media is the summary of interview with Afshin Sajedi, a leading member of The Iran Front.
This was my last interview of the first serries on the program „Gozar“ on TV, about the murder of Dr. Masood Masjoody in Canada. Given the important developments related to Iran, this interview was conducted in two parts.
First Part
In the first part, I reviewed the latest developments related to Iran, and in the second part, I addressed the murder of Dr. Masoud Masjoody. In analyzing these developments, I describe the conflict as having entered a more complex phase. I explain that the situation has evolved beyond isolated events and now involves direct targeting of infrastructure. I point out that regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have become involved, indicating an expansion of the conflict beyond its initial scope. I also observe that European countries have taken a more cautious stance than expected. Rather than fully aligning with the conflict, they appear to have distanced themselves to some extent. I interpret this as a form of disagreement within the Western alliance, although I clarify that it should not be exaggerated as a full division.
Geopolitical realities
I explain that from a legal standpoint, Europe’s hesitation is understandable, given that the geographical framework of NATO does not formally include Iran. However, I argue that the geopolitical realities have changed significantly over the past two decades. I emphasize that traditional definitions of security, law, and geopolitical boundaries are no longer sufficient to explain current dynamics. In my view, institutions like NATO may require fundamental reassessment to adapt to these changes.
I then shift to a more critical analysis of Europe’s position. I suggest that European reluctance may partly be influenced by long-term structural factors, including what I describe as the corrupting influence of the Islamic Republic over the past two to three decades. I explain that through a combination of pressure, incentives, and political influence, the Iranian regime has managed to affect decision-making processes in parts of Europe.
I further elaborate that this influence operates not only at the governmental level but also within societies. I point to demographic changes and the growing impact of communities influenced by the Islamic Republic’s ideological outreach. I explain that this creates a situation in which governments must balance political decisions with electoral considerations, especially when parts of their population are susceptible to such influence.
From my perspective, this is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a broader strategy. I describe various social and cultural manifestations such as public demonstrations, religious displays, and demands related to social norms as interconnected elements of influence. I argue that these should be understood as tools of pressure rather than independent developments.
Iran’s capabilities
I then turn to a specific example to illustrate my point. I refer to a recent statement issued by a major military command structure within Iran, which claimed that Western countries do not fully understand Iran’s capabilities. I note that this statement may seem surprising given the recent setbacks faced by the regime, yet I argue that it reflects a deeper reality: a persistent underestimation by Western actors. I connect this observation to another development a call by extremist groups for attacks on religious targets associated with Israel and the United States.
I interpret this as evidence of indirect operational links, suggesting that such groups function as proxies, even if this is not immediately apparent. Expanding my analysis, I describe the conflict as a “hybrid war.” I emphasize that this war did not begin recently but has been unfolding over a long period through multiple dimensions, political, ideological, economic, and security-related. I argue that what we are witnessing now is simply the more visible, hard phase of a much longer process.
I also highlight the scale of military investment by the Iranian regime, particularly in missile development. I explain that these investments, along with the nuclear program, represent enormous financial costs that cannot be justified as defensive measures. I argue that these resources were not invested for the benefit of the Iranian people, but rather to sustain a broader strategic agenda. In contrast, I point out that the population has borne significant economic and social pressure.
I describe this imbalance as evidence that the regime’s priorities are fundamentally disconnected from the welfare of its citizens. I then present a structural interpretation of the Iranian political system. I describe it not as a conventional government but as a transnational network with multiple operational branches across different countries. I argue that this structure extends beyond Iran into regions such as Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and beyond, making it extremely difficult to confront through purely internal means.
Based on this analysis, I conclude that the current conflict is part of a broader and unavoidable trajectory. I argue that what we are witnessing is not simply a war initiated by external actors, but the culmination of a long-standing conflict between the Iranian people and the governing system, now entering an international phase. I also acknowledge the human cost of the conflict. I emphasize that any loss of life is tragic, regardless of the side involved. However, I compare this with ongoing internal losses within Iran, such as deaths from mismanagement, accidents, and environmental conditions, to argue that systemic harm has long existed.
Finally, I address a key issue raised in the discussion: the movement of armed groups into Iran. I explain that from my perspective, this development was predictable. I describe these groups as part of a broader network linked to the regime’s external operations. I argue that their movement into Iran reflects internal redeployment rather than foreign intervention. I also provide a legal and strategic explanation for why such movements may have been allowed. I suggest that once these groups operate within Iran’s territory, particularly in a wartime context, they become legitimate targets under international law, making it easier for opposing forces to act against them without legal complications.
In concluding my analysis, I emphasize the importance of understanding narratives and misinformation. I warn against attempts to frame the conflict as a war against Iran itself rather than against the governing system. I stress that such narratives are often amplified deliberately and should be approached with caution. Overall, I present this discussion as part of a broader effort to analyze events not only at the surface level, but within their deeper structural, political, and strategic context.
Second Part
I explained in the second part of the interview that I wanted to briefly remind the audience where our earlier discussions had stopped, so that we could continue the thread in a clear and coherent way. I recalled that we had been discussing the active legal cases of Dr. Masood Masjoody, and that we had reached the point where the court had said that the anonymous accounts attacking him, identified as “John Doe 1,” “John Doe 2,” “John Doe 3,” and so on, had to be traced so that the real individuals behind them could be identified.
From there, I invited the continuation of the discussion. I then clarified that this point was indeed the right place to resume, but I emphasized that it could not really be separated from the larger picture. In my view, Dr. Masjoody had not intended from the beginning to push matters this far. Although he was clearly someone who stood against injustice and had likely seen many forms of wrongdoing before, I do not believe that his original intention was to enter such a dangerous confrontation.
Ballistic missile work at Simon Fraser University
Rather, I believe he was gradually drawn into an extremely forbidden and hazardous field, one that ultimately cost him his life. My analysis was that he had unintentionally entered an area tied to issues that were far more sensitive than they first appeared. I noted that during the current conflict, a significant number of countries had been targeted by Iranian missile attacks, some of them involving ballistic missiles.
What Dr. Masjoody had identified, and what I believe was central to the danger he faced, was the presence of an expert connected to ballistic missile work at Simon Fraser University. Because ballistic missile technology is deeply tied to mathematics and advanced technical expertise, and because Dr. Masjoody was active in that same academic space, he was naturally in a position to notice matters that others might overlook.
I explained that when he reported this issue to the university and tried to pursue it, the university did not clearly confirm or deny the substance of his concern. Instead, it turned the issue against him. He was accused of misconduct toward women, and although I clarified that he was not formally “fired” in the strictest sense, his contract simply was not renewed. In practical terms, however, the effect was the same: he was pushed out.
I also explained that I could not say with certainty whether the accusation had been made to him in writing or verbally, but I knew that he had been accused in that manner and that he subsequently filed a legal complaint against the female colleague involved. At this point, I highlighted two recurring characteristics that I believe are always present in structures tied to the Islamic Republic: opacity and deadlock. In my assessment, both of these elements appeared at every stage of Dr. Masjoody’s case. The difference, however, was that he did not back down.
He persisted with extraordinary energy and determination. He did not become discouraged, and he continued pushing forward despite the many obstacles placed in his way. I described how, when he brought his complaint to court, the judge did not meaningfully address the substance of his allegations. Instead, the judge effectively removed the matter from his own jurisdiction, treating it as merely an employment dispute that should be resolved elsewhere, between employer and employee.
Yet what stood out to me was that even while declining to engage substantively with Dr. Masjoody’s complaint, the judge used language that I considered deeply demeaning. Expressions suggesting that Dr. Masjoody’s claims were bizarre or shocking were, in my view, highly inappropriate for a judicial ruling. To me, this looked like a form of suppression rather than neutral adjudication. I further pointed out that the judge created a procedural trap.
On the one hand, he distanced himself from the matter by implying it did not belong in that forum; on the other hand, he positioned himself to remain involved in the appellate phase or in any renewed effort by Dr. Masjoody to seek relief. This meant that Dr. Masjoody was effectively forced either to reframe his complaint in another legal context or to return to the same hostile judge. It was this closed loop, this legal dead end, that compelled him to continue his campaign in order to break through it.
Accusations of harassement
I then explained that around the same time, an online publication reported on the accusations of harassment against him. In my view, that report later became one of the foundations for the continuing attacks on his character. I used the interview to make a warning here: because those allegations were never proven, anyone who continues repeating them now exposes themselves to legal risk and could themselves become subject to future claims or proceedings.
As Dr. Masjoody pursued the matter, he discovered that the journalists behind that online publication were connected to the Aga Khan community, specifically to the Nizari Ismaili current. He then came to believe that this network had strong links to the Islamic Republic.
When he pursued complaints related to those connections, those complaints also failed to produce a satisfactory result. At the same time, he attempted to reopen his complaint relating to Simon Fraser University. I noted that in the second complaint, which took place in 2025, the university’s lawyer went so far as to ask the court to designate Dr. Masjoody as a vexatious litigant. What struck me as remarkable was the reasoning used. I said that this is a matter of record and can be reviewed.
The argument advanced was that he allegedly had problems with women, had issues with left-wing forces, and was a supporter of President Trump as if being a Trump supporter were itself evidence of instability or grounds for labeling someone as troublesome. I found it striking that the judge appeared to take such arguments seriously. This created the impression, at least to me, that there may have been a shared underlying bias between the lawyer and the judge: that if someone held certain political views, he could be more easily portrayed as irrational, paranoid, or abnormal.
I interpreted this as part of a broader effort to destroy his credibility and push him toward frustration and silence. I then explained that this was the point at which Arezou Soltani entered the story in a much more direct way. While Dr. Masjoody was in the middle of his campaign regarding the missile-related issue, he also became involved in an action concerning four Iranian Kurds who were facing execution. He organized an action around that issue, and it was at this stage, I explained, that Ms. Soltani falsely claimed that he was organizing a pro-Hamas demonstration.
I emphasized that this made little sense in light of the way he was already being portrayed elsewhere, including as a supporter of Trump. Nevertheless, Ms. Soltani published a video on her own Instagram account urging people and monarchist supporters to mobilize and prevent the demonstration. I explained that Dr. Masjoody responded by taking both that video and the documentation relating to his own action to court and filing a complaint against Ms. Soltani for false allegations. In my understanding, this is where she became trapped. When the court summoned her for explanation, she apparently had no convincing response.
She repeatedly ignored the court two times, three times, four times. After repeated fines for contempt or non-compliance, the sanctions escalated and eventually a warrant was issued. As I explained it, Dr. Masjoody was expected to appear in court around early February, shortly before he disappeared from public view. I stated that this was a crucial stage. I also said that there were several concurrent issues unfolding at that time: the Soltani case, the John Doe matter, and the matter involving Reza Pahlavi, who, according to the account presented, had also failed to appear in court or submit a defense, which meant the complainant’s claims had advanced to the damages phase.
In other words, during the final weeks of Dr. Masjoody’s life, his cases had begun to move forward in a more meaningful way. I then gave my own assessment of what was most sensitive among all these issues. In my view, the most important and dangerous part was the “John Doe” case. I explained that if the court were to identify who was actually behind those anonymous accounts, that could reveal individuals operating inside the opposition, particularly in monarchist circles, who had ties or connections linked to the Islamic Republic.
I said that Dr. Masjoody himself had come to believe something like this. My interpretation was that the effort to silence him was driven less by fear of a short-term court sanction against Ms. Soltani and more by the danger that the deeper network behind the online attacks, and perhaps behind the missile-related issue, might be exposed. I stated clearly that I did not believe Dr. Masjoody was killed simply because Ms. Soltani feared going to jail. While she had issued threats and taken actions, I thought that explanation was too narrow.
I argued that the key question is whether the attempt on his life was merely a personal decision, something I regard as highly unlikely, or whether it was an organized act carried out by a broader current operating behind her. I then brought up Mehdi Ahmadzadeh Razavi in this context, noting that although Ms. Soltani publicly appeared as a monarchist, her father and uncle were reported to have held high-ranking positions in the Revolutionary Guards in West Azerbaijan, a highly sensitive region.
I was careful to say that I could not claim organizational ties with certainty, because my information was limited, but I did consider the familial links important and relevant. When I was later asked whether Ms. Soltani and Mr. Ahmadzadeh Razavi were partners or simply knew each other, I answered cautiously. I said I did not know their exact formal status, but that Dr. Masjoody had indicated there was an informal emotional relationship between them. I stressed that this was not an area in which I wanted to make definitive claims, because it crosses into private life, though I acknowledged that for investigators such a relationship might be significant.
I then returned to the question of motive. I said that this was exactly the central issue that needed clarification. If one were to accept a purely personal motive on the part of Ms. Soltani, then a legal defense team could try to build a narrative around that. But I stated that the larger evidence strongly suggested something broader. In my assessment, this killing could not plausibly have been the result of an ordinary personal dispute.
The evidence, I argued, pointed much more strongly toward a coordinated and organized act, a networked killing rather than an isolated one. I explained why this matters beyond the immediate criminal case. For me, the issue is not only whether these two individuals had motive and whether they carried out the killing. The issue is whether a political current that seeks to play a role in Iran’s future may have been connected to an act of physical elimination.
I stressed that this current already promotes exclusion in its discourse. In my reading, its language is inherently eliminatory: it leaves no room for pluralism, no real place for others to coexist politically. Based on statements made by that current itself, I said that even their own vision of transition seemed to imply that for at least the first six months of power, others would have no meaningful role. To me, that already reflects an exclusionary political culture.
Confidence in the legal future of Iran
From there, I argued that if a current with such a worldview is also implicated in physical elimination, then this becomes a matter of profound importance for the future legal and political order of Iran. I invoked the idea that in a democratic system the injury done to one person affects the whole civic body. That is why I insisted that clarifying this case is not simply about justice for one victim. It is about whether we can have confidence in the legal future of our country.
I then expressed my hope that the search for truth in this case would develop alongside the creation of a proper legal infrastructure for whatever political structure the opposition or the Iranian people seek to build in the future. I emphasized that while the court is focused primarily on whether the two accused had motive and whether they committed the act, our concern is broader. We want to know whether they acted alone or whether a larger network stood behind them.
In my view, this is especially important because violent rhetoric and calls for exclusion have already been present for some time. The fear is that what had previously remained at the level of threats may have now become action. I described this as the difference between two perspectives. One is the narrow legal perspective of a court in British Columbia, which is understandably focused on the specific criminal charges. The other is a broader legal-political perspective, one that matters deeply to the opposition and to anyone concerned with the future political order of Iran.
From this broader perspective, the question is not only who committed the killing, but what structures, ideas, and networks made it possible. I also explained that there is now an effort underway to reopen and re-evaluate all of these judicial decisions and patterns in a more systematic way. I said that if the matter can be advanced first through legal and judicial institutions, that would be best. If not, then it must be placed before legal scholars, before the judgment of society, and before global public opinion.
Only then, I said, will it become clear whether Dr. Masjoody was in fact moving in the right direction and whether he had been confronting hidden and mafia-like currents almost alone. I further announced that, fortunately, with the cooperation of Dr. Masjoody’s friends, a truth-seeking committee had begun to take shape under the framework of the Front for the Revival of Law and National Sovereignty. I said that this effort was still in its early stages, but that it would eventually provide channels of communication for anyone who wished to help or who had relevant information.
At the conclusion of the interview, it was noted that many people are following the case closely and are upset that the death of Dr. Masjoody has not received the level of media attention it deserves. I agreed that this itself is revealing. In my view, just as his voice had been suppressed while he was alive, there now appears to be an effort to keep even the news of his death quiet.
That too must be taken seriously. Finally, I expressed gratitude for the opportunity to discuss these issues in depth. I stressed that these conversations are difficult and at times legally complex, but absolutely necessary. I made clear that this was not only about one tragic death. It was about truth, accountability, legal integrity, and the type of political future Iran may face if these matters are ignored.
©Afshin Sajedi, mehriran.de, 15.04.2026
